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ABSTRACT 
IS discipline has seen a large and growing body of research on IT sourcing, with economic theories informing a large portion 
of this work. The paper examines use of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) as a theoretical lens to study IT sourcing 
decision (internal vs. external). It reviews TCE’s major assumptions, and assesses key constructs of frequency, asset 
specificity, opportunism, and uncertainty, as to their operationalization and results through a meta-analytic review of selected 
papers. The clearest evidence is seen in case of production costs, while findings on transaction costs are somewhat 
inconclusive. Moving the research agenda to co-evolutionary drivers of sourcing as buyers and vendors co-evolve, instead of 
cost-led determinants, holds potential for future research. Taking a longitudinal process approach to improve understanding 
of complex phenomena is suggested, given limited understanding from using a ‘reference discipline’ theory.  
Keywords 
Outsourcing, sourcing, Transaction cost economics, meta-analysis, economics. 
INTRODUCTION 
IT outsourcing can be defined as “the delegation, through a contractual arrangement, of all or any part of the technical 
resources, human resources, and the management responsibilities associated with providing IT services to an external 
vendor” (Clark et al., 1995). IS researchers have attempted an understanding of this phenomenon, using theories drawn from 
various reference disciplines. 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) (Ang and Straub, 1998), agency theory (Logan, 2000), and the resource based view 
(RBV) (Teng et al., 1995), are the three most popular theories that have been used to explain IT sourcing phenomenon, 
accounting for majority of articles in a recent review (Hui and Beath, 2001). These theories differ in their assumptions and 
ontological approaches, attempting to identify issues within their underlying assumptions. Economics theories assume an 
underlying rationality and maximizing approach. Other theories attempt to go beyond the efficiency seeking approach of 
economic theories. Among this preferred set of lenses, TCE is the most frequent approach. 
The paper introduces TCE, to draw attention to the implicit assumptions and constructs (Williamson, 1985). A sample of 
highly cited research papers is introduced, and findings on each TCE dimension are presented. These are accompanied by 
research questions on the respective dimension, and some thoughts on the research agenda. Discussion section includes 
limitations of TCE, suggestions on alternative theoretical lenses, and implications for IS research. Contributions and 
limitations conclude the article. 
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) 
This section reviews TCE, and assesses the use of its discrete components in IS literature. The key constructs of frequency, 
asset specificity, opportunism, and uncertainty, are explored as to their use and operationalization. This is done in parallel 
with deconstructing the assumptions of original theory. 
TCE: Assumptions and variables 
Frequency, asset specificity, and uncertainty are the key variables in TCE. Transaction being the unit of analysis, TCE sets to 
demarcate the boundary of the firm, given these characteristics of a transaction.  
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In order to unpack the variables/assumptions, these are compared with the ideal of perfect markets in economic theory. The 
following table (table 1) shows the assumptions that are relaxed in order to reconcile economic theory with organizational 
reality. 
 Neoclassical assumptions TCE relaxations 
Information Perfect information Asymmetries, leading to uncertainty 
Buyers & sellers Many buyers and sellers Small number, leading to opportunism 
Specificity Identity of buyer/seller does 
not matter 
Identity of the buyer-seller dyad matters, leading to asset 
specificity 
Rationality Rational actors Economic actors are “intendedly rational, but only 
limitedly so”, or bounded rationality 
Maximization of 
utility 
Maximizing orientation “Unobjectionable, if all of the relevant costs are 
recognized.” 
Table 1. TCE assumptions 
 
Given the dimensions of frequency and asset specificity in TCE, governance structure (Williamson, 1985) under each 
combination is identified (table 2). 
Frequency Asset specificity 
 Non-specific Mixed Idiosyncratic 
Occasional Outsource with neo-classical contract 
Recurrent 
Outsource with 
classical contract Relational 
contract 
Insource 
Table 2. Governance structure under TCE 
 
The framework is limited, necessarily, by the definitions of its components, viz., asset specificity and frequency. “The cost 
effective choice of organization form is shown to vary systematically with the attributes of transactions.”(Williamson, 1985) 
Therefore, efficiency seeking is the only motivator considered in the sourcing decision. More important, the efficiency is not 
absolute, but comparative. 
APPLICATION OF TCE 
The following sections review the application of TCE in a selected sample of outsourcing literature. The set of highly cited 
research papers is introduced, and findings on each TCE dimension are presented. The findings are accompanied by research 
questions on the respective dimension, and some thoughts on the research agenda and possible theoretical contributions. 
Selected papers 
The main source of information was the review (Hui and Beath, 2001) mentioned earlier. The selected papers are cited as 
‘representative work’ in the substantive area. In addition, ABI/Inform was consulted for research papers in IS Sourcing. The 
listed papers were checked individually, and some of them were replaced with others that showed a clear use of TCE. As 
shown in table 3, these are from top-tier journals and conferences, mostly from 1994 to 1998. Most of the research represents 
empirical work, and details such as sample sizes and results are available. It is difficult to check for a representative sample in 
any statistical sense, given the narrow criteria: study of IT outsourcing using TCE. The key areas of interest are TCE 
dimensions. It was verified whether the dimension was covered in the study, and its operationalization and results were 
recorded. The significance and sign of results is important to compare with TCE expectations. 
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Article Year of 
publication 
Study type Sample 
size (if 
empiric
al) 
TCE dimensions 
(selected operationalizations shown in brackets) 
    Frequen
-cy 
Asset 
specificity 
Opportunism Uncertai
nty 
  
Production 
cost 
Apte 1990 Conceptual  Y   Y Y 
Ang & 
Cummings 
1997 Survey 221  Y Y* 
(supplier 
presence) 
Y* Y* 
Ang & 
Straub 
1998 Survey 225 Y* 
(perceived measure of transaction cost) 
Y* 
Aubert et al 1996 Case study 10 Y* Y*  Y*  
Cheon et al 1995 Conceptual  Y Y  Y Y 
De Looff 1998 Case study 23   Y* 
(many 
suppliers) 
Y* 
(clear 
require
ments) 
Y* 
Heiskanen 
et al 
1996 Case study 3  Y*  Y*  
Jurison 1995 Conceptual     Y Y 
Lacity & 
Willcocks 
1995 Case study 61 Y Y    
Loh 1994 Survey 226  Y  Y  
Loh & 
Venkatrama
n 
1995 Survey 159   Y* 
(composite 
measure) 
  
Nam et al 1994 Case study 10  Y  Y  
Nam et al 1996 Survey 154  Y Y 
(number of 
potential 
vendors) 
Y*  
Poppo 1998 Survey 152  Y*  Y Y* 
(scale 
economies 
at buyer 
firm) 
Saarinen 1994 Survey 55  Y  Y  
Smith 2003 Conceptual   Y Y  Y 
Table 3. Application of TCE in sourcing 
Y shows dimension(s) covered in the study, with significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk* 
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RESULTS FROM TCE 
Uncertainty and asset specificity are the dimensions used most frequently in selected articles (table 3). As expected, there are 
different operationalizations of these key dimensions. The results are somewhat mixed, and generally weak. In the sections 
that follow, each dimension is defined with reference to Williamson (Williamson, 1985), before going into the relevant 
conclusions. Research questions and agenda are suggested, which hold potential for contribution. 
Uncertainty 
TCE (Williamson, 1985) refers to uncertainty of a strategic kind “attributable to opportunism…bounded rationality limits are 
quickly reached─since the entire decision tree cannot be generated for even moderately complex problems” (p. 59). Strong 
self-interest seeking leads the participants to provide selective information. Given bounded rationality, it is not possible to 
make detailed choices. In combination, these behavioral assumptions lead to uncertainty. 
Most empirical papers included some measure of uncertainty (table 4). The conclusions are mixed, even somewhat 
conflicting. Support for TCE was seen in case study work (Aubert et al., 1996, DeLooff, 1998, Heiskanen et al., 1996) and 
one survey (Nam et al., 1996). The other surveys (Loh, 1994, Poppo and Zenger, 1998, Saarinen and Vepsalainen, 1994) did 
not find significant relation between uncertainty (as operationalized) and outsourcing. One survey-based study (Ang and 
Cummings, 1997) reported higher uncertainty leading to more (not less) outsourcing. They observe “as technological 
uncertainties escalated, large banks adhered more closely to sourcing arrangements advocated and legitimatized by 
regulators.”  
Among results that support TCE conclusions, there were a variety of operationalizations. Uncertainty was framed as a 
measurement problem (Aubert et al., 1996), in which the buyer’s ability to measure IS services is important. Observability 
and verifiability were suggested as conditions for effective measurement. Measurable services could be outsourced easily. In 
contrast, software development was difficult to measure, and hence, more difficult to outsource. Concluding that  outsourcing 
is advisable (only) when requirements are specified in advance, and measured later, seemed to arise from controllability 
ratings (DeLooff, 1998). Heiskanen et al (Heiskanen et al., 1996) combined uncertainty with asset specificity to divide 
systems into routine, standard, and speculative, with recommendations as market, hybrid, and hierarchy, respectively. 
Uncertainty of IS function (Nam et al., 1996) was negatively related to substitution by vendor. 
  Uncertainty  
Article Study type Operationalization Significance 
Ang & 
Cummings 
Survey Technological uncertainty Y* 
Aubert et 
al 
Case study Observability, Verifiability Y* 
De Looff Case study Requirements for services can be specified in advance, and 
measured afterwards (clear requirements) 
Y* 
 
Heiskanen 
et al 
Case study (lack of) well-specified requirements Y* 
Loh Survey Obsolescence of current h/software, Cost-performance 
trends, Quality of final outputs 
Y 
Nam et al Survey NA Y* 
Poppo Survey Technological uncertainty Y 
Saarinen Survey Requirement specification Y 
Table 4. Application of TCE dimension ‘uncertainty’ in sourcing,  
with significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk* 
  
Broader measures of uncertainty (Loh, 1994) and relating it to ‘dyadic costs’ showed an insignificant path coefficient. 
Technological uncertainty had no effect (Poppo and Zenger, 1998) on sourcing choices. In contrast to Heiskanen, 
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requirement uncertainty (Saarinen and Vepsalainen, 1994) (similarly combined with specificity) seems to have no effect on 
sourcing choice. 
These results lead to the following research questions: 
RQ1: Under which conditions (of asset specificity) is uncertainty a concern? 
RQ2: Among business, environmental, or technological uncertainty, which is more relevant? 
RQ3: How are regulatory perceptions formed in the first place? Is it ‘received wisdom’ in the industry? What are its dynamic 
characteristics? 
RQ4: How do buyers interact with vendors and technologies at different stages of maturity to form perceptions of 
uncertainty? 
RQ5: How is uncertainty related to trust, and what are its antecedents in the context of sourcing? 
Asset specificity 
TCE (Williamson, 1985) classifies assets on their degree of specificity, wholly specific and non-specific (p. 54-55). These are 
explained further as “durable investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of 
which is much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users…”. In other words, it refers to the lack of alternative use 
of underlying assets. 
This would easily be the most important dimension of TCE. It is claimed that “the importance of asset specificity to TCE is 
difficult to exaggerate…” (p. 56) although additional conditions are added later. 
The selected set of papers shows weak support for this key construct (table 5). Two case study papers (Aubert et al., 1996, 
Heiskanen et al., 1996) and one survey-based article (Poppo and Zenger, 1998) show evidence that supports transaction cost 
theory, while others show insignificant results. 
Type of activity (Aubert et al., 1996), with software development and operations at the opposite ends of spectrum, seemed to 
explain outsourcing. When firm specificity was combined with requirement uncertainty, sourcing decisions (Heiskanen et al., 
1996) could be explained. Lower satisfaction was observed with outsourced activities as these became (Poppo and Zenger, 
1998) more firm-specific.  
  Asset specificity  
Article Study type Operationalization Significance 
Ang & 
Cummings 
Survey Investment in specialized equipment, Specialized technical 
skills specific to (buyer) firm, Specific business skills & 
knowledge to buyer 
Y 
Aubert et al Case study Software development activity (type) Y* 
Heiskanen et 
al 
Case study Specificity to buyer company Y* 
Lacity & 
Willcocks 
Case study Seen as support/commodity or specialized Y 
Loh Survey Overall architecture, Operating procedures, IT 
knowledge/experience base, IT staff training 
Y 
Nam et al Survey NA Y 
Poppo Survey Firm-specific assets Y* 
Saarinen Survey Managers’ estimates, Level of using existing system as a 
basis for requirements 
Y 
Table 5. Application of TCE dimension ‘asset specificity’ in sourcing,  
with significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk* 
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At an overall level (Ang and Cummings, 1997) specificity shows weak correlation with outsourcing. However, analogous to 
the effect of regulatory influence, interaction with firm size and peer influence showed expected effects. Broader measures of 
asset specificity (Loh, 1994) and relating it to ‘dyadic costs’ showed an insignificant path coefficient. In trying to explain the 
extent of substitution by vendors, asset specificity (Nam et al., 1996) was not significant. Specificity (Saarinen and 
Vepsalainen, 1994) of the system, when combined with uncertainty, seemed to have no effect on sourcing choice. 
The research questions raised by these results are: 
RQ1. Which assets are relevant (operating procedures, knowledge of business rules, architectural), to measure specificity? 
RQ2. With respect to whom (buyer, vendor, technology, or their combinations) should it be measured? 
RQ3. What is the nexus with (types of) uncertainty? 
It would seem that IT sourcing practices have evolved to make these intangible assets more relevant. In this respect, 
technologies which affect coordination and agility, rather than simple automation of tasks, need more attention and 
theorizing. Research on interorganizational systems, where ownership of assets is distributed, could be an interesting area for 
research. 
Frequency 
TCE (Williamson, 1985) refers to governance structures (p. 60) “more sensitively attuned to the governance needs of non-
standard transactions than are unspecialised structures, ceteris paribus”. Frequency of transaction is involved, ranging from 
occasional to recurrent. 
This dimension was used in four papers, as shown in table 6. Some of these (Apte, 1990, Cheon et al., 1995) are conceptual 
papers, which hypothesize that low frequency could lead to high transaction costs. The logics are similar, in that infrequency 
of contracting (Cheon et al., 1995) will increase ‘relationship building costs’, or alternatively, buyer should use the same 
vendor (Apte, 1990) in multiple contracts. 
  Frequency 
Article Study type Operationalization Significance 
Apte Conceptual # sourcing contracts with same vendor Y 
Aubert et al Case study Use of different skills Y* 
Cheon et al Conceptual Infrequency of contracting Y 
Lacity & 
Willcocks 
Case study Ongoing activities or occasional Y 
Table 6. Application of TCE dimension ‘frequency’ in sourcing,  
with significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk* 
 
The results differ when looking at empirical work (Aubert et al., 1996, Lacity and Willcocks, 1995). It is interesting to see 
how the authors look for alternative explanations and units of analysis to reconcile their results with TCE. Aubert et al 
conclude that “frequency refers to the use of skills…rather than software development projects”. In their case study sample, 
most firms were sourcing externally for skills that were required intermittently. The emphasis, therefore, is more on a load 
leveling function, rather than transaction cost. However, the results do not strictly conflict with TCE, which would expect 
external contracting for occasional transactions. The other study (Lacity and Willcocks, 1995) attempted to classify its 
observations into different contract types (according to governance structures shown in table 2), using the information on 
asset-specificity and frequency from their interviews. Even when a limited set of sourcing decisions were considered (those 
which were believed to be successful by the sampled firms), anomalies were seen. These activities’ recurrent nature along 
with high asset specificity was expected to result in a relational contract (table 2), but the actual sourcing arrangements were 
structured as neo-classical contracts, i.e., in the top half of the table (instead of lower half). An alternative explanation within 
TCE framework is that decision making was necessarily occasional, motivating IS managers to perceive it as akin to buying 
capital equipment. 
This leads us to the following research questions: 
RQ1: Is ‘transaction’ as a unit of analysis applicable to IS sourcing context? 
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RQ2: What does frequency refer to (buying, use, decision making)? 
RQ3: Does decision making dictate the ‘frequency’ that should be used? 
As sourcing arrangements tend to emphasize more relational elements, with multi-year contracts, the timeframe is redefined. 
This would suggest scope for “longitudinal” application (David and Han, 2004) of TCE. Given that decision making is 
occasional, and dominated by relational factors, cultural fit and other social antecedents might become important. At which 
point these factors become important, is a key question for research. 
Opportunism 
TCE (Williamson, 1985) refers to three levels of self-interest (p. 47), from obedience, simple self-interest seeking, to 
opportunism. Among these, opportunism is “the strongest form” that refers to “incomplete or distorted disclosure of 
information, especially to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse”. Strictly speaking, 
opportunism is a behavioral assumption of TCE, along with bounded rationality. 
This dimension of TCE is included in four empirical papers (table 7). While there are no conflicting results, the levels of 
significance are not very reassuring. It seems that context has a role, and the limited explanation that opportunism provides is 
a concern. 
When operationalized (Ang and Cummings, 1997) as the availability of large number of suppliers, the variable was 
significantly correlated to higher outsourcing. When the results were analyzed by influencer and size of firm, the effect was 
significant for peer conformity in large buyers.  
Two papers show somewhat weaker results. Using case study approach (DeLooff, 1998) availability of sufficient suppliers is 
seen as an ‘advisable’ condition for outsourcing, as it reduces small number bargaining problem. However, the controllability 
criterion is judged to be ‘medium’ in importance by general managers as well as IS managers. In contrast, cost is seen as 
highly important, more so by general managers. The other study (Loh and Venkatraman, 1995) concludes that average degree 
of outsourcing is negatively related to potential opportunism, though it shows the lowest levels of significance among the 
independent variables used. 
 
  Opportunism 
Article Study type Operationalization Significance 
Ang & 
Cummings 
Survey Adequate supplier presence Y* 
 
De Looff Case study many suppliers Y* 
 
Loh & 
Venkatraman 
Survey Breach of contract by vendors 
Dependence on specific vendors 
Biased portrayal of benefits by vendors 
Y* 
 
Nam et al Survey potential number of vendors Y 
 
Table 7. Application of TCE dimension in sourcing,  
with significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk* 
 
In contrast, Nam et al (Nam et al., 1996) use extent of substitution by vendors as a dependent variable, and potential number 
of vendors is seen to be insignificant. 
These results lead to the following research questions: 
RQ1: What are possible measures of opportunism, e.g., relative size of buyer/seller firm, length of contract? 
RQ2: How are peer perceptions on ‘adequacy’ (Ang and Cummings, 1997) formed in the first place?  
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RQ3: Is its presence ‘received wisdom’ in the industry? What are its dynamic characteristics? 
Assumptions of self-interest seeking behavior need to be revisited, diluting the basis of TCE. Raising questions on behavioral 
assumptions, and setting the phenomenon under institutional context, hold promise. Behaviors of vendors, and the 
antecedents of fairness, are also interesting research avenues. 
Production cost 
Although transaction cost economics sets to go beyond “neoclassical production cost” some empirical studies included 
production cost, in addition to the dimensions of transaction costs (table 8). These results seem to be more conclusive, with 
each of the papers showing high explanatory power of the dimension. 
Comparative production cost advantage through IT outsourcing (Ang and Straub, 1998) was related to higher degree of IS 
outsourcing. While transaction costs were also significantly related to outsourcing, the effect was much smaller. Similar 
results were seen (Ang and Cummings, 1997) with (external) production cost advantages significantly related to outsourcing. 
Advantages of scale (DeLooff, 1998), leading to low cost, were seen as important criteria by managers, more so among 
general managers. Scale economies were seen as important, when related to insourcing (Poppo and Zenger, 1998). 
  Production cost 
Article Study type Operationalization Significance 
Ang & 
Cummings 
Survey External production cost advantage Y* 
Ang & Straub Survey Perceived production cost advantage Y* 
De Looff Case study Advantages of scale Y* 
Poppo Survey scale economies at buyer firm Y* 
 
Table 8. Application of TCE dimension in sourcing,  
with significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk* 
 
The results do not contradict TCE, as “the object is not to economize on transaction costs but to economize in both 
transaction and neoclassical production cost respects.” (Williamson, 1985) (p. 61) However, it raises the hypothetical 
question: would the effects that were seen to support TCE exist, if this measure had been incorporated? It is possible that the 
relatively unclear effects of transaction costs would be even weaker, in an extended operationalization of theory. 
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
This section views the dimension-wise conclusions with a critical perspective, given the limitations of TCE. It includes 
suggestions on alternative approaches to study sourcing, and implications for IS research. Contributions and limitations 
conclude the article. 
There is probably an over-application of theory, in the sense that transaction costs do not add substantially to our 
understanding. Production costs are adequate to explain the phenomenon, under TCE assumptions of efficiency-seeking. 
Limited empirical support has also been observed in more comprehensive review (David and Han, 2004) of TCE application. 
Alternatively, a better explanation of the phenomenon is required. A related issue is the use of TCE, and economics as a 
reference discipline. These concerns are discussed later. 
Based on the selected set of articles, we might conclude that production cost advantages are so high that transaction costs are 
only a minor factor in sourcing decisions. TCE leaves the door open to this possibility (Williamson, 1985) “Whether 
transaction cost economies are realized at the expense of scale economies or scope economies thus needs to be assessed. A 
trade-off framework is needed to examine the production cost and governance cost ramifications of alternative modes of 
organization simultaneously.” Cost pressures (Apte, 1990, Ang and Straub, 1998) and cost predictability were seen as key 
factors by some authors.  
An overlay of institutional factors on efficiency-seeking behavior might hold some potential. It has been suggested (Roberts 
and Greenwood, 1997) that institutional constraints can be ‘grafted’ on the TCE framework. In this integrated framework, 
cognitive constraints are hypothesized to limit the evaluation of extant sourcing arrangement, and the subsequent search for 
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alternatives. The institutional environment further limits the consideration set to a smaller set of legitimated designs. As there 
are limited ways of inferring (rather than observing) cost efficiencies, only highly legitimate designs are ultimately selected. 
Grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) is yet another approach, given its success in study of phenomena less understood 
by existing theories. Given the unique nature of IT (Lacity and Willcocks, 1995), it is possible that resulting theory could be 
different from the dynamic capabilities framework, and possibly resemble the relational view (Dyer and Singh, 1998). 
The key drivers 
However, we might explore other possibilities to theorize, by moving the discussion to co-evolutionary drivers, as against 
cost-led determinants. There are some starting points in the articles, e.g., vendor availability has dramatically increased 
(Apte, 1990). This could be explained by expansion of large IT firms (e.g., HP) into services, and increased global sourcing 
(Greenemeier, 2002). Anecdotal evidence of growth in variety and size of outsourcing contracts would suggest a co-evolution 
of vendor capability, industry practice, and buyer behavior. Buyer requirements could lead to vendors’ capability 
augmentation in an IT activity, which then leads to new outsourcing arrangements and successes. Alternatively, vendors 
could stretch their capabilities to identify and serve new needs, increasing pressure on buyers to outsource. These innovations 
then diffuse among less innovative peers, gaining acceptance as an “established practice”. Highly publicized contracts, such 
as Kodak (1989) and British Petroleum (early 90’s) could serve as catalysts in this process. As institutional acceptability 
increases, it leads to more firms using outsourcing.  
This dynamic view of organizations and environment involves “the joint outcome of managerial intentionality, environment, 
and institutional effects” (Lewin and Volberda, 1999), with cycles of innovation and imitation. Markus and Robey (1988) 
have discussed the type of theories that are available to IS researchers. While imperative theories are generally variance 
theories, and organizational/emergent ones are process, an imperative process model has great appeal. It helps overcome the 
static nature of variance models, because “while recognizing and accepting the complexity of causal 
relationships…(maintain) the goals of generalizability and prediction” (Markus and Robey, 1988). However, an imperative 
process model will require longitudinal data. 
This brings us to use of TCE as the major theoretical lens to view outsourcing. Limited empirical support, and difficulty of 
operationalization have also been observed in marketing (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997) and strategy (David and Han, 2004) 
reviews of TCE application. It would appear that some assumptions are a bit extreme, e.g., opportunism rather than simple 
self-interest seeking, to explain behavior. In some ways, use of TCE as a dominant perspective might have also constrained 
researchers from taking multifaceted view of the phenomenon, e.g., judging by lack of research on the vendor’s side (Hui and 
Beath, 2001) and service delivery. Given the size of contracts, it might not be advisable to ignore the consequences for 
suppliers. As an example, EDS took a multi-million write down on its $7 billion outsourcing deal with the Navy, affecting its 
credit ratings. Vendors also have their own strengths when compared with (buyer) firms, e.g., access to higher quality of 
employees (Levina et al., 2003). 
The larger issue on ‘reference discipline’ (Keen, 1980) and use of theories is also relevant. While reliance on reference 
disciplines has been decried as “short term and relatively easy salve” (Benbasat and Weber, 1996), it has been a popular 
approach (Swanson and Ramiller, 1993). While it is possible to use current theories, development of theories and frameworks 
that are specific to the phenomenon hold more long-term promise. 
Implications of the suggested co-evolutionary drivers include actions that both vendors and firms can take to accelerate the 
acceptance of new sourcing practices, e.g., AT&T’s deal with Accenture to manage its residential billing operations. While 
imitation effect can explain why peers are influenced to select outsourcing (Ang and Cummings, 1997) it might be preferable 
to investigate simultaneous changes in managers’ beliefs and supplier capabilities. For practitioners, the results would seem 
to be less interesting. However, the relative primacy of production costs lends some support to the offshoring phenomenon, 
as these vendors enjoy production cost advantages in form of wage arbitrage. 
Contributions of this paper are as follows. First, it ‘unpacks’ TCE to look at its hidden assumptions and different 
operationalizations in study of IT sourcing. This paper complements more general reviews of TCE (David and Han, 2004) by 
discussing its application to specific phenomenon. Second, it looks for new explanations of sourcing phenomena. Third, it 
adds to the debate on IS as a reference discipline. In many ways, the paper adds its voice to the call for research (Hui and 
Beath, 2001) that suggests an evolutionary perspective, including all key stakeholders─buyers as well as sellers, and the IT 
artifact.  
Limitations include sample of literature available for meta-analytic research, along with the operationalizations and theories 
considered for analysis. A similar analysis on a larger sample will add to the generalizability of conclusions, as literature 
continues to grow. 
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